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tional law, states presumably would follow the
practice for their own convenience or due to
foreign pressures, but not out of a belief that the
practice is a true international legal obligation. A
more specific example of the usefulness of a metarule in customary law formation is again the principle of reciprocity in the absence of a binding law
or agreement. In the classic prisoner's dilemma
game that characterizes many situations of international interaction (e.g. policies towards common
resource usage or intellectual property protection),
the restriction of reciprocity, coupled with repeated
play, disciplines players' strategies to exclude the
most Pareto-inferior outcomes (Francesco Parisi,
"Customary Law", Palgrave Dictionary of Economic
Terms, 1998).
Thus, ius cogens as described here serves two
main purposes. It introduces a moral criterion to
international law, satisfying part of the desire of natural legal theory. In addition, it acts as a set
of meta-rules that excludes many undesirable
agreements between states and facilitates more
efficient customary law formation. However, the
formation of such international social norms is
has not been explained properly. Indeed, economics as a science of human behavior has not
explained the formation of social and moral norms
at the level of individuals, let alone societies,
nations, or the world. In the Vienna Convention,
Article 64 clearly indicates that such peremptory
international norms can develop. Two hundred
years ago slavery was not opposed by a peremptory international norms, but now it is one of the
clearest precepts of ius cogens. So how did that
and other norms develop, and is their development a process exogenous to law? In other words,
does law at the national and international level
somehow contribute over time to the formation of
future peremptory intemafional norms? Answering this question in full may be unattainable,
but I believe the endeavor would be a most
needful and interesting research program.
Joyce Sadka
Economics Department
Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
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Justice and the Rule of
Law in International
Relations
No inquiry into international law, and its
place in the international order, can get very far
(or make much sense) without a theory of what
law is, and what makes the law worthwhile.
Mine is this: that the central element of law in every
legal system what makes law "law" as distinct
from other systems of rules or coercion is law's
claim to codify justice. All laws and legal systems
claim to realize justice. Rules that do not claim
justice cannot claim to be laws (Sellers 1992A).
This is not to say that all laws are just, but rather
that all legal systems claim to be just, or to realize
justice better than other available systems for
mediating conflicts and regulating human society.
Applied to international relations this means
that international norms always claim to be
just, when they seek recognition as "law" to
govern the actions of states (or other international persons or behavior). For example, a hegemonic power might seek to impose its own worldview as "law" on other, less-powerful states, but
in doing so would also claim to be enforcing "justice", which is to say, enforcing norms that ought
to be obeyed, without coercion. Such norms may
not be just. But they must claim to be. The frank
imposition of unjust norms on subservient
populations would not be law, without the claim
of justice to support it.
The Rule of Law
The rule of law is the system, much praised
since antiquity, in which the "imperia legum
potentiora est quam hominum" "the rule of law is
greater than the rule of men." The value of this
method of government as advocated by Aristotle,
Livy and their successors in Italy, England,
France and the United States of America depends
on the assumption that law serves justice, which
is to say the common good of all those subject to
its regulation (Sellers 2000). If the law serves
justice, then the rule of law realizes justice, while
rule by the will of individual men or women
would serve private interests, against the common
good of the community as a whole.
The value and desirability of the rule of law
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depends entirely upon its efficacy in securing
justice. While all law claims to be just, not all
laws actually always are. One could easily
imagine a legal regime in which laws claiming to
be just in fact systematically advanced the unjust
ends of a ruling elite or hegemon. This makes the
actual success of any legal system's service to
justice the only effective measure of its value and
binding force on any supposed subjects of its
legal control. Unjust legal systems do not deserve
deference, although prudence may dictate circumspection in defying their power, so long as they
enforce their will (Sellers 1992B).
The rule of law secures predictability, even in
unjust regimes, by providing known regulations
in advance. When laws rule, and not men, people
can plan their actions, based on the law's known
provisions, whether these are just or not. Since
laws always claim to be just, the identification
and application of law may tend to soften the rule
of even very unjust regimes. By seeking to present
their edicts as "law", and therefore deserving of
respect, even despots and oligarchs must claim
concern for the general welfare and common good
of the people. This may encourage or at least
allow some judges and others to apply the law more
justly than insincere and self-seeking legislators
ever in fact intended.
The Natural Law
Let us call the law that actually would be just
in a given situation the "natural law." The
natural law is the law that all legal systems claim
to seek and impose, though few will ever really
do so. Some may claim quite simply with Thomas
Hobbes that natural law requires no more than to
know your superior's will, and to follow it. This
claim, like all other assertions that any system of
norms be recognized as "law", amounts to an
assertion of justice. Thomas Hobbes defined "justice" as whatever your sovereign desires (short of
self-immolation) (Sellers, 1998). Few other theorists
would be so bold, but anyone who speaks of
"law" makes an implicit assumption that the
system in question claims to realize the natural justice that all law necessarily claims to serve.
The actual validity (Sellers 1992A) and legitimate authority (Sellers 1992B) of any system
of law depend on that system's usefulness in discovering and enforcing the natural law of nay
given situation. Supposed standards of international law (for example) deserve deference and
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obedience only to the extent that they either
actually implement the natural law or (and this is
the important point) represent a system of legislation more likely to realize the natural law than
would unregulated conflicts, in which every individual simply decided for his or herself what the
natural law requires to be done.
International law differs from most other law in
that its content is relatively unsettled. Most
legal systems have widely accepted mechanisms
for determining what law requires, when different
views conflict. International law has no obvious
legislature, judiciary or executive power. This
means in many cases that disputes over issues in
international law provoke direct appeals to natural
law, because the mediating institutions that would
settle disputes about the content of natural law are
weak, missing or controversial. If international
law is "the law of nature applied to nations" (as all
law is, or claims to be) then the direct study of
nature (i.e. human nature and needs) will be the
best method for finding what international law
requires, when other methods fail.

The Positive Law
Legal systems exist to preclude the necessity
of direct appeals to natural law in resolving disputes. Given human self-interest, self-righteousness, and the natural capacity for self-deception,
perceptions of the natural law will often (perhaps
usually) vary, whenever conflicts arise. Legal systems and the rule of law offer objective methods
for determining what the natural law requires, so
that one claimant can defer to the other, without
trying the relative accuracy of their perceptions
with violence or battle (which the weaker or
unluckier party will lose, whatever the actual
merits of the claim). Legal systems produce "positive law" to clarify the content of natural law when
different perceptions of justice collide.
Not all positive law will actually embody the
natural law of the case, although positive law
will always claim to do so. In fact, positive law
may be mistaken, unjust and unfair. If so the legal
system has failed, on its own terms, because all
legal systems claim to find justice. The natural
measure of any legal system's value, validity and
worthiness to be obeyed is its efficacy in doing
what it claims to do realizing the justice of the
case. If a legal system finds and enforces the just
result better than would have happened in the
absence of that legal regime, then its rule deserves
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deference, until a better system can be found to
take its place.
The binding force and public interest of the
"positive law" of international relations depends
entirely upon its ability to implement a just world order to resolve international conflicts and controversies. Different proposed sources of law should
be evaluated according to their usefulness in finding
and maintaining a just would order, or as just a world
as will be possible, given the circumstances. This requires taking into account the world order that already
prevails, to the extent that one does.
If, for example, widely recognized positive law
already exists in the form of "international
custom" or treaties, then this "law," and the system
that supports it as "law" must endorse it as "just".
Whether such international "law" deserves deference
will depend on whether this claim to establish justice
is actually true (or not).
Conclusion
International law, like all law, claims to codify
justice. Codifying justice is desirable because
it precludes or settles conflicts, and prevents the
imposition of unjust desires by one state or person on
another. The rule of law keeps those with power honest, by guiding their activities to serve the
common good, not their own private interests or
desires. This only works so long as good law
rules. Not all laws serve justice as well as they
claim to. The greater this gap between "natural" and
"positive" law, the less the validity or legitimacy of
the legal system in question, and the less it deserves to
be obeyed.
International "law" is unusually vague in prescribing its positive laws. Debates about the
content of international law often reduce to conflicts about natural law, or different possible conflicting sources of positive law, which may yield
different results. Real benefits will follow when
states establish a just system of positive law to
resolve their international conflicts. No such
system fully governs every conflict (yet). Until it
does states and scholars should seek to encourage the
development of just institutions of international adjudication (Sellers 1996), without relinquishing their direct commitment to natural law
and justice. Those charged with interpreting international law should remember that all law claims
to be "just" and frame their decisions accordingly,
to secure the eventual rule of law in international
relations.
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